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When Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uz-
bekistan gained independence in 1991 after over a century of Russian 
and Soviet rule, none of the republics was fully prepared for the conse-
quences from the collapse of the USSR. Their sociological profiles were 
shaped by Soviet policies and their economic situation was a function of 
a Soviet planned economy. Their political elites did not have any experi-
ence concerning international relations either, as their external borders 
and affairs were quite strictly controlled by the USSR. They were inex-
perienced actors exposed from the very beginning to intensive political 
pressure of foreign powers aspiring to broaden their own influence in 
the post-soviet space.
The young republics were not the only actors surprised with the ge-
opolitical change. The disintegration of the USSR marked a  frantic be-
ginning of a so-called New Great Game (Rashid, 1997). Since 1991 this 
concept has formed a predominant theoretical framework used for anal-
yses of political changes taking place in post-soviet Central Asia. On 
the one hand, it reflects the attempts of the Russian Federation to keep 
control over the  post-soviet states after the  collapse of the  USSR. On 
the other, it shows the attempts of other international powers competing 
with Russia, like the United States, to broaden their own spheres of influ-
ence. The geopolitical struggle takes place in a region important for both 
strategic and economic reasons, for it is situated between the Caucasus, 
Afghanistan, North-West China and Siberia, and it contains reasonable 
amounts of energy resources – primarily oil and natural gas (Currier and 
Dorraj (ed.): 83–101).
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The term New Great Game was accepted not only because it vividly 
describes the relations between international powers in the region, which 
is little known to the average reader. Historically, it refers to the Great 
Game between the Russian and British Empires at the break of the 19th 
and 20th centuries, which was taking place in the  very same part of 
the globe. It is also based on the classical geopolitical concept defining 
the territory of contemporary post-soviet Central Asia as the Heartland – 
the region allowing to politically control the whole of Eurasia (Lach and 
Wendt, 2010). Thus, the analysis in the terms of a New Great Game gives 
us useful tools for examining the ongoing political processes in Central 
Asia. This is based on a theoretical framework allowing one to develop 
a reference to analogical processes in other parts of the world and places 
the discourse in the context of a broader history of international relations 
and international relations theory.
However, after over twenty years since the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion, a closer look at the Central Asian political landscape raises questions, 
whether the above classic interpretation is still fully functional. The pri-
mary question concerns the validity of the analogies as well as the de-
scriptive and explanatory instruments used in political circumstances 
predating the First World War in the reality of post Cold War Central Asia. 
The fundamental difference is the presence of a new global actor, the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, which follows different patterns of political be-
havior than Russia or the United States. China’s entrance is slowly but 
steadily changing the political and economic landscape of Central Asia, 
just like many other parts of the world. This in turn raises the question 
about how has the regional political situation changed as far as the strate-
gies of the major players are concerned? Can one still fully describe them 
in geopolitical or zero-sum game terms?
It seems it is time to update the traditional political approaches re-
garding post-soviet Central Asia to the  reality of 21st  century. The pri-
mary goal of the article is to discuss the changes occurring in the region 
since the 1990s, mostly the fact of a growing Chinese presence. It will be 
achieved by comparing the political strategies of the Russian Federation, 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China concerning region-
al and security challenges in post-soviet Central Asia in the context of 
the New Great Game. The strategies of the major players will be supple-
mented with an overview of the growing political activity of the post-soviet 
republics. This will allow us to define the limits of the classical geopolitical 
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interpretations of the political situation, like the New Great Game con-
cept, in explaining the processes occurring in the region. In many respects 
the predominant geopolitical approaches still remain valid analytical in-
struments. However, if followed without reflection, they threaten with 
oversimplifying the situation.
The Approach of the Russian Federation
Despite the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation remained 
the dominant political force in the region. There were many reasons for 
that. Firstly, the  post-soviet republics were economically dependent on 
Moscow. The major assets of Central Asia are energy resources: oil and 
natural gas. On the  eve of independence their large-scale exports were 
possible only via the Russian pipeline network. Strategic issues were not 
less important. Central Asian post-soviet states were not fully prepared 
for independence and their security was to a  serious degree dependent 
on Russian assistance. Additionally, one should not forget about the his-
torical and cultural ties developed during over a  century long Russian 
rule. Regardless of judgments, the “russification” and “sovietization” pro-
cesses placed the countries in the space of Russian cultural influence. All 
these issues allowed the Russian Federation, although it lost direct control 
over Central Asia, to perceive the region as its own; an almost exclusives 
sphere of influence.
Russia defines its approach predominantly in terms of broadly under-
stood security. From the military perspective, regional asymmetrical threats 
are particularly important (Redo, 2007). The Russian military presence is 
also meant to guarantee the safety of local borders (especially in Kyrgyzstan) 
and internal stability (primarily in Tajikistan) (Kozłowski, 2009: 137–138). 
Russia has ambitions to limit the activity of local extremist groups (espe-
cially in Uzbekistan) who could potentially generate instability in the vi-
cinity of its borders. Despite the  fact that this issue is not as important 
as in case of the Caucasus, it became a reason for closer Russian-Chinese 
military cooperation with the post-soviet states (Strachota, 2008).
Not any less important is another dimension of security, energy secu-
rity, which is closely related to economic politics. Central Asia, the Caspi-
an region in particular, is relatively rich in energy resources: oil (mostly in 
Kazakhstan) and natural gas (predominantly in Turkmenistan). As it was 
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already mentioned, during the first years of independence the Central Asian 
states had no alternative ways of large-scale export, except for the Rus-
sian pipelines running through the  territory of the  Russian Federation 
(the only alternative for pipelines is the railway). Before the development 
of the Baku–Tibilisi–Ceyhan pipeline (BTC) (2006), the Kazakhstan–Chi-
na pipeline (2009) and Turkmenistan–China pipeline (2009), the energy 
policies of the Central Asian states were to a large extent dependent on 
the energy policy of the Russian Federation.
In general, Russia managed to keep the privileged position in post-so-
viet Central Asia, although mostly in the military dimension and less in 
an economic one. Despite the Chinese expansion the Russian Federation 
is still the major economic partner of all of the states in the region. Al-
though the system of pipelines has become more and more diversified, 
Moscow is still controlling important export routes of energy resources. 
However, one should note that the Russian Federation did not manage to 
reasonably and lastingly strengthen its influence (Ross, 2011). A charac-
teristic feature of the Russian approach to the region is its post-colonial 
perception. A lack of constructive cooperation in managing the economic 
and social challenges troubling the Central Asian political actors is also 
noticeable (Jarosiewicz and Falkowski, 2008). The Kazakhstan–Belarus–
Russian Federation Customs Union does not seem to be able to effectively 
address these problems. The  emerging alternatives of cooperation with 
other powers endanger the future position of the Russian Federation.
All of the  remarks above lead to a  conclusion that the  analysis of 
Russian foreign policy concerning Central Asia in geopolitical terms of 
the New Great Game is relatively accurate. Russia defines its approach 
mostly in geopolitical categories, which matches the metaphorical con-
tent of the concept well. However, one should notice that the influence of 
the Russian Federation during the first two decades of Central Asian inde-
pendence became visibly weakened, which may lead to a conclusion that 
its approach is relatively less functional than ones exercised by the other 
actors engaged in the region.
The Politics of the United States of America
The political reality of Central Asia has undergone dramatic changes 
after September 11, 2001. The most striking difference was the introduc-
tion of a U.S. military presence in two post-soviet states. The first military 
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actions against the Taliban were already undertaken on October 7, 2001 
as operation Enduring Freedom. They would not have been possible with-
out military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Although the  U.S. was present economically in the  region already 
in the 1990s, American military bases have brought significant changes 
(Karrar, 2009). First and foremost, Central Asia partly became a theater 
of the War on Terror. This happened without any control of the UN Secu-
rity Council, which was particularly disturbing for the other key players: 
China and Russia. In the long run both of them were anxious as to wheth-
er the military intervention against the Taliban regime would turn into 
a long lasting strategic presence in the region, rich in energy resources and 
situated at the back door of both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 
the Russian Federation (Karrar, 2009). Secondly, after some time the mil-
itary offensive proved to be less effective than it was expected. Although 
the Afghan capital was under the control of a pro-Western regime, large 
parts of Afghanistan were still controlled by Taliban forces. Meanwhile, 
the military operations seemed to destabilize the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) in the northern part of Pakistan. The seemingly per-
manent military conflict close to Chinese and Russian borders negatively 
influenced the prognoses concerning security in Central Asia (Medeiros, 
2009: 133–142).
The American intervention should not be perceived as absolutely neg-
ative for the other players. During the first few years of Operation Enduring 
Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had a pos-
itive influence on the regional security. The Taliban forces had to retreat 
and Al-Qaida was on the defensive, which solved some of the immediate 
problems for Russia, China and the new post-soviet states. The actions 
taken by  the U.S. military diminished the  threat of radical Islamic ex-
pansion in Central Asia. This in turn gave more time for local regimes to 
adapt to the international environment and to the changing geopolitical 
situation. One can state that in the short run Operation Enduring Free-
dom and ISAF were beneficial for Russia, China and the post-soviet states. 
They effectively targeted the same threats as the Shanghai Five and later 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization did (Kozłowski, 2011: 208–202).
The energy relations between the U.S. and Russia are more one-di-
mensional in character. As the representatives of the American govern-
ment put it, the major goal of the U.S. engagement in the energy sector in 
Central Asia was not to gain access to regional oil and natural gas; rather, 
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it was to limit the scope of Russian domination in the region. The region-
al energy resources became an element of a geopolitical game. This ema-
nated particularly from the BTC pipeline project, which became the first 
alternative route of oil exports from Central Asia not passing through 
the territory of the Russian Federation.
The above-mentioned observations lead to a conclusion, that defining 
the  interests of the U.S. in the region in geopolitical terms of the New 
Great Game is only partly valid. The U.S. definitely took steps to weaken 
the position of the Russian Federation, especially in the area of the energy 
resources. However, the  consequences of their military activity are not 
so one-dimensional. One can also have some doubts whether the Ameri-
can presence in its current form will become a permanent feature within 
the Central Asian reality. Negative consequences of the Global Financial 
Crisis in 2008–2009 for the American economy as well as the difficult 
situation in Iraq and Afghanistan may limit the potential of expansion for 
the U.S.in other parts of the world, including Central Asia. Thus, it seems 
to be more accurate to depict the actions of the U.S.in terms of tactical 
advantages in relations with the Russian Federation, especially in the field 
of energy resources, than strictly in geopolitical terms of the New Great 
Game competition.
The Approach of the People’s Republic of China
Beginning from December 1991, China was slowly but steadily de-
veloping the fundaments for its future activity in the post-soviet Central 
Asia. It followed two parallel routes. The PRC was developing bilateral 
relations based on mutual trust and was aiming to develop a multilat-
eral platform for cooperation in the region – the Shanghai Five and later 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. On the current level of its posi-
tion’s development in Central Asia, China is concentrating its efforts on 
economic activity in the region.
This approach proves not only to be successful but also seems to be 
the most prospective in the future. Post-soviet Central Asian states were 
eagerly developing growingly sophisticated economic and political rela-
tions with China. It is worth noticing, that this process occurred without 
any serious crisis, as was the case in the relations of the U.S. or Russia 
with the states of the region. While the regional potential of the U.S. or 
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Russia was fluctuating (within the context of the War in Afghanistan for 
America, and the Georgian War for Russia), the regional potential of Chi-
na was steadily growing. The PRC has also proven to be able to adapt to 
dramatic changes, like the events of September 11 or the2008–2009 Glob-
al Financial and Economic Crisis (Lanteigne, 2009: 158–153).
China did not enjoy the  advantage of local connections, as was in 
the case with Russia, nor a global scope of action, as it was in the case 
of the United States. As the  immediate neighbor of Central Asia, Chi-
na cared about stable and consensual development of long-term relations 
with the new states. Instability in Central Asia could have caused instabil-
ity in the Chinese Xinjiang – Uighur Autonomous Region. Thus, during 
the  first years of coexistence, regional security and economic coopera-
tion were the imperative of Chinese politics as Central Asia is perceived 
by Beijing not only in terms of international politics but also in terms of 
the stability of Xinjiang (Zhu, 2010: 111–139).
In the short and medium run, China adapts itself to the existing bal-
ance of power in Central Asia. In this respect the goal is to exploit Russian 
and American involvement in maintaining regional security to minimize 
the costs of its own involvement in issues regarding regional stability. If 
the PRC got involved in security issues in Central Asia it would mean 
confrontation with Washington or Moscow and the relocation of large po-
litical and economic potential needed elsewhere, especially in the boom-
ing Chinese economy. In the long run the PRC is trying to develop a tight 
web of economic interconnections in the region. If it succeeds, the eco-
nomic development should positively influence stability in the  region, 
thus keeping the costs of regional security low, as well as erode Russian 
and American influence, based largely on military strength (Lanteigne, 
2005: 115–142).
A perfect emanation of this approach and one of the greatest achieve-
ments of the PRC on the more and more complex Central Asian political 
and economical arena was to initiate the multilateral regional dialogue be-
tween China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
The initially informal talks of the so called Shanghai Five, after accession 
of Uzbekistan in 2001 were formalized into the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). Its first goal was confidence and trust building be-
tween the member states. As time went by the agenda of the organization 
started to widen. Members of the SCO are proudly emphasizing that it 
was the very first international organization of the 21st century designed 
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to combat terrorism and organized crime (in the nomenclature of the or-
ganization, the three evils: terrorism, separatism and extremism), as well 
as to develop economic cooperation. Soon the organization became an em-
anation of the  new approach of China to international affairs. Chinese 
leaders emphasize its multilateral and egalitarian character, which puts it 
in a stark contrast with unilateral politics of Washington or the post-im-
perial ambitions of Moscow. The  smaller members of the  organization 
declare that it is the main reason of its success. One must note that it 
was China who bore the burden of the SCO and its institutions. The first 
signal of Chinese dominance was organizing its secretariat in Beijing in 
2001 (Pan, 2007: 99–109). Other signals were Chinese preferential loans 
for the members of the organization in 2004, reaching around 900 million 
USD, and scholarships for 1500 students from other states of the organi-
zation to study in China (Zhu, 2010: 121–127). It is also noteworthy, that 
the organization became an arena for the first political tensions between 
the Russian Federation and the PRC (‘Sino-Russian Split at Regional Sum-
mit’, Asia Times, 15 Nov 2007: 5). The rise of China and the relative de-
cline of the U.S. and Russian power may change its character in the future.
It is hard to fit the Chinese approach into the categories of the New 
Great Game. China is more inclined to perceive the  local situation in 
terms of a sophisticated win-win scenario rather than in terms of aspi-
rations of geopolitical dominance in the region. While geopolitics formed 
the context of China’s evaluation of the situation in Central Asia after 
the collapse of the USSR, the  issues currently dominating the Chinese 
approach are economic interests calculated against the political costs of 
their realization. Thus, in the case of China, one should be particularly 
cautious in accepting the purely geopolitical perspective of Central Asian 
political or economic affairs.
The Post-Soviet States of Central Asia
The creation of five new independent republics in 1991 opened a new 
chapter in the history of Central Asia. In the18th and 19th century it was 
dominated by civilization centers in Beijing and Moscow (Dillon, 2004: 
66–67). In the 20th century it became an arena of socialist modernization: 
Russian in five republics and Chinese in Xinjiang (Gladney, 2004: 375–
378). Since the middle of the century, the rule of the PRC and the USSR 
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seemed to be undisputable. The situation changed dramatically in 1991. 
Nevertheless, historical experiences made many observers reduce the role 
of the new post-soviet states in the context of the New Great Game in 
Central Asia to pawns in the hands of the international players. This ten-
dency, however, is misleading. Of course, the post-soviet republics do not 
have the  same potential as any of the  earlier discussed global players. 
However, their attempts to strengthen their own position in the interna-
tional environment have become growingly intense. After almost 25 years 
of independence they have become an important factor in the  regional 
political landscape.
Post-soviet Central Asia encompasses five republics that proclaimed 
their independence in 1991 after the collapse of USSR: Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan, the big-
gest republic of the five, is also a regional political and economic leader. 
Its large oil reserves are an important element in regional competition 
for natural resources between the Russian Federation, the U.S. and re-
cently more and more often China. The success of the Kazakh politics 
is marked by the fact that nowadays Kazakh oil can be exported not only 
to and via Russia, but also to China and directly to Western countries. 
Another country enjoying considerable energy resources, namely natural 
gas, is Turkmenistan. Since the death of Turkmenistan’s first president, 
Saparmurat Niyazov, its authorities have been dynamically searching for 
partners that would make them less dependent on Russia in the context of 
gas exports. China tries to take advantage of this situation, which is best 
expressed by the development of a new Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline 
in 2009. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the poorest countries of Central 
Asia. The former seemed to be the most democratic state of the region. 
However, it experienced two radical changes of power in just five years, as 
well as ethnic unrest (Kozłowski, 2010: 119–145). The latter, after a civil 
war in the 1990s, faces serious economic challenges. Some commentators 
even state it is on the verge of collapse (Falkowski, 2009). Uzbekistan, 
the most populous country of the region, bordering all the new republics 
and ruled autocratically by Islam Karimov, has to deal with anti-system-
ic Islamic opposition, particularly active in the Fergana Valley, a natural 
corridor leading from Afghanistan to the heart of post-soviet Central Asia 
(Olcott, 1995: 23). Its geographic position helps it to be an important 
factor in the  transit of regional energy resources as well as in regional 
security politics.
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In the beginning of the 1990s, all the mentioned republics were ac-
tive only to a very small degree internationally. Today, the situation has 
changed. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in particular strive 
to widen the  scope of their international activity and to capitalize on 
the economic and political opportunities brought by the changes occur-
ring in the  international scene. For example, after September 11, all of 
the Central Asian states became closer with NATO states, temporarily 
balancing Russian military influence in the region. The most significant 
steps were taken by Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan as they accepted U.S. mil-
itary bases and NATO military presence on their territories, in conse-
quence benefitting financially and politically from closer relations with 
the West (Collins, 2006: 308–304). This did not prevent them from ex-
ploiting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (however, Turkmenistan 
is not a member) and Russian-Chinese initiatives to call for a timetable 
of U.S. military presence in the region in 2005. Three years later, they 
used the same organization to show assertiveness to Russian expansion 
by not acknowledging the  independence of Abkhazia and South Osset-
ia after the Georgian-Russian War (Kozłowski, 2010: 154–165). Yet, all 
the  republics continue their security cooperation with Russia, which is 
still a key factor in this respect in Central Asia and a counterweight to 
Chinese economic expansion.
If one analyses the  political situation in post-soviet Central Asia, 
one must not underestimate the importance of the post-soviet states. All 
the new republics remember well the years of Russian and Soviet hegemo-
ny. While historically dependent on Russia, since the U.S. and China en-
tered the region they have gained unprecedented political opportunities of 
playingone power against the other. It is important to understand, that all 
of the regional actors have a historical experience of political maneuvering 
between great world powers (Collins, 2006). Two decades of independence 
have provided them with new political perspectives and opportunities. 
One may say, that none of the five republics wishes for the absolute suc-
cess of Beijing, Washington or Moscow. None of them wants to openly 
confront any of them as well. Finally, none of them wants to become 
a pawn in a dispute between these strong powers. Now they do not seem 
to be eager to give them up nor to exchange the old hegemon for a new 
one. None of the  Central Asian societies is going to resign from even 
a  small part of young independence. The  emerging multilateral reality 
of international relations and conflicting interests of the  global players 
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in the region gives them a lot of opportunities to exploit for the good of 
their own national interests. Thus, such a creative adaptation to the del-
icate situation by regional post-soviet elites is a factor that should not be 
neglected in the analysis of the international situation in the context of 
the New Great Game.
Conclusions
The analysis leads to a conclusion that the New Great Game concept 
or other geopolitically inclined approaches, although still useful in the as-
sessment of the Central Asian political situation, do not entirely match 
the current situation in the region. If they are to be taken into considera-
tion they have to be supplemented with the following remarks.
Firstly, the  geopolitical situation has changed the  most because of 
the growing Chinese presence in post-soviet Central Asia. Chinese politics 
regarding the post-soviet states in the region are a characteristic example 
of Chinese approach to international affairs based on an economically 
flavored win-win approach rather than geopolitical hegemonic ambitions. 
On the  contemporary map of post-soviet Central Asia there is a  place 
for intense bilateral relations between China and local actors (mostly Ka-
zakhstan and Turkmenistan) and for the very first Chinese multilateral 
initiative, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, for dynamic develop-
ment of Chinese economic collaboration with the politically new region of 
the world. Additionally, this also allows for ambiguous cooperation against 
three evils: terrorism, extremism and separatism, which are the particu-
larly important in context of Western intervention in nearby Afghanistan. 
All of these initiatives have fundamentally changed the balance of power 
in the region compared to the 1990s, when the concept of the New Great 
Game was first formulated.
Secondly, the approaches of the main players do not always match 
the geopolitical criteria. The geopolitical thought process seems to per-
vade the Russian perspective of the situation in the region and to be an 
important factor in the regional strategy of the United States. However, 
this may not be said about the Chinese perspective. In the 1990s, China 
had to accept the initial advantage of Russia and the U.S. on the regional 
scene, and thus their geopolitical approach. However, all of its later ac-
tions were aimed to develop a strategy based on mostly economic win-win 
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scenarios. Actually one may say that the PRC does whatever possible to 
lessen the importance of geopolitical factors, which work against it, and 
to strengthen the economic ones, which work in its favor. One also has to 
note that while the positions of Russia and the U.S. in the region fluctu-
ated and generally deteriorated, while the Chinese position is becoming 
increasingly important in Central Asian affairs. This seems not only to 
point to one of the limitations of the concept, but also to suggest that in 
the case of Central Asia the geopolitically oriented approach is not always 
the most accurate one.
Finally, the  traditional geopolitical approaches to the  region and 
the New Great game concept underestimates the role of regional post-sovi-
et states in Central Asia. Many analysts reduce them to pawns in the New 
Great Game between the  U.S., the  Russian Federation and the  PRC. 
While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
may not be able to run fully independent economic or security policies, 
they are still able to skillfully maneuver between the conflicting interests 
of Beijing, Washington and Moscow and to develop their own political po-
tential. In conflict situations they are increasingly able to take advantage 
of contradictory ambitions of the great players.
The  analysis of the  political relations in contemporary post-soviet 
Central Asia suggests that China is the best student within the history of 
achievements and mistakes of other empires (Mearshimer, 2001). From 
the Chinese perspective, the political situation in the  region right after 
the collapse of the USSR was very complex. The rise of an absolutely new 
political space on the western flank of the Middle Kingdom required a co-
ordinated and immediate and long-term reaction. From 1991 China was 
cautiously and steadily developing the fundaments for the future activity 
(Feng, 2007: 204). The Chinese strategy was twofold. On one hand, Bei-
jing was investing in trust and confidence building with the new republics 
by bilaterally solving border disputes and developing closer economic re-
lations. On the other, it funded and strengthened multilateral platforms 
of contacts: the Shanghai Five and later the Shanghai Cooperation Organ-
ization. The approach gave the desired effects. Post-soviet Central Asian 
states quickly opened up economically and politically for cooperation with 
China (Sun, 1998: 153). It is worth emphasizing that the cooperation be-
tween China and Central Asian states was fluid and free of crises, while 
similar contacts with the U.S. and Russia were not. One can just mention 
consequences of the intervention in Afghanistan in the case of the U.S. 
Krzysztof Kozłowski 202
and of the war with Georgia in the case of the Russian Federation. Even 
the  global changes after the September 11 did not prevent China from 
expanding in Central Asia (Medeiros, 2009: 45–60).
However, China’s role in the region started to become noticed only af-
ter the 2008–2009Global Financial Crisisand continually keeps being un-
derestimated. This tendency is also the most often recurring flaw, besides 
underestimating the role of post-soviet Central Asian states, of political 
analyses conducted from the perspective of the New Great Game. China 
has chosen to adapt to the circumstances, at first modeled mostly by Rus-
sia and the United States. However, this does not mean that it was passive. 
From the perspective of almost a quarter century of independent Central 
Asia, if one compares the approaches of the Russian Federation and that 
of the United States with the Chinese one, the evaluation seems to be 
in favor of the PRC. While respecting the initial advantage of Russia and 
the temporary advantage of the U.S. after September 11, China managed 
to exploit the opportunities and nullify the threats posed by the political 
situation. From the regional perspective, this meant greater dynamics of 
trade and improvement of the Xinjiang economic situation. As years went 
by the cooperation encompassed also security issues and energy resources. 
At the same time the burden of keeping Central Asia stable was put on 
the shoulders of Russian and the United States, allowing China to con-
centrate on economic issues. From the perspective of over two decades, 
developing bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and concentrating on 
economic aspects of collaboration proved to be the most effective way to 
built and preserve strong political position in the region, and to change 
the rules of the New Great Game.
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